Continued...
A suggestive incident is worth recording here. In the course of my inspection of the lines that morning, while passing along Culp's Hill, I found the men hard at work intrenching, and in such fine spirits as at once to attract attention. One of them finally dropped his work, and, approaching me, inquired if the reports just received were true. On asking what he referred to, he replied that twice word had been passed along the line that General McClellan had been assigned to the command of the army, and the second time it was added that he was on the way to the field and might soon be expected. He continued, ``the boys are all jubilant over it, for they know that if he takes command everything will go all right.'' I have been told recently by the commander of a Fifth Corps battery, that during the forced march of the preceding night the same report ran through that corps, excited great enthusiasm amongst the men, and renewed their vigor. It was probably from this corps -- just arrived -- that the report had spread along the line.
On my return to headquarters from this inspection General Meade told me that General Sickles, then with him, wished me to examine a new line, as he thought that assigned to him was not a good one, especially that he could not use his artillery there. I had been as far as Round Top that morning, noticed the unfavorable character of the ground, and, therefore, accompanied Sickles direct to the Peach Orchard, where he pointed out the ridges, already described, as his proposed line. They commanded all the ground behind, as well as in front of them, and together constituted a favorable position for the enemy to hold. This was one good reason for our taking possession of it. It would, it is true, in our hands present a salient angle, which generally exposes both its sides to enfilade fires; but here the ridges were so high that each would serve as a ``traverse'' for the other, and reduce that evil to a minimum. On the other hand it would so greatly lengthen our line -- which in any case must rest on Round Top, and connect with the left of the Second Corps -- as to require a larger force than the Third Corps alone to hold it, and it would be difficult to occupy and strengthen the angle if the enemy already held the wood in its front. At my instance General Sickles ordered a couple of companies to ascertain if the wood was occupied.
About this time a cannonade was opened at Cemetery Hill, which indicated an attack there, and as I had examined the Emmettsburg Ridge, I said I would not wait the result of the reconnaissance, but return to headquarters by way of Round Top, and examine that part of the proposed line. As I was leaving, General Sickles asked me if he should move forward his corps. I answered, ``Not on my authority; I will report to General Meade for his instructions.'' I had not reached the Wheat-field when a sharp rattle of musketry showed that the enemy held the wood in front of the Peach Orchard angle.
As I rode back, a view from that direction showed how much farther Peach Orchard was to the front of the ``direct line'' than it appeared from the orchard itself. In fact there was a third line between them, which appears, as seen from the orchard, to be continuous with Cemetery Ridge, but is nearly six hundred yards in front of it. This is the open ground east of Plum Run already described, and which may be called the Plum Run line. Its left where it crosses the run abuts rather on Devil's Den than Round Top; it was commanded by the much higher Peach Orchard crests, and therefore not an eligible line to occupy, although it became of importance during the battle.
As to the other two lines, the choice between them would depend on circumstances. The direct short line through the woods, and including the Round Tops, could be occupied, intrenched, and made impregnable to a front attack. But, like that of Culp's Hill, it would be a purely defensive one, from which, owing to the nature of the ground and the enemy's commanding position on the ridges at the angle, an advance in force would be impracticable. The salient line proposed by General Sickles, although much longer, afforded excellent positions for our artillery; its occupation would cramp the movements of the enemy, bring us nearer his lines, and afford us facilities for taking the offensive. It was my judgement the better line of the two, provided it were strongly occupied, for it was the only one on the field from which we could have passed from the defensive to the offensive with a prospect of decisive results. But General Meade had not, until the arrival of the Sixth Corps, a sufficient number of troops at his disposal to risk such an extension of his lines; it would have required both the Third and Fifth Corps, and left him without any reserve. Had he known that Lee's attack would be postponed until four P.M., he might have occupied this line in the morning; be he did not know this, expected an attack at any moment, and in view of the vast interests involved, adopted a defensive policy, and ordered the occupation of the safe line. In taking risks, it would not be for his army alone, but also for Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, with the political consequences of their capture. Gettysburg was not a good strategical position for us, and the circumstances under which our army was assembled limited us tactically to a strictly defensive battle.
After finishing my examination I returned to headquarters and briefly reported to General Meade that the proposed line was a good one in itself, that it offered favorable positions for artillery, but that its relations to other lines were such that I could not advise, and suggested that he examine it himself before ordering its occupation. He nodded assent, and I proceeded to Cemetery Hill.
The cannonade there still continued; it had been commenced by the enemy, and was accompanied by some movements of troops towards our right. As soon as I saw that it would lead to nothing serious, I returned direct to the Peach Orchard, knowing that its occupation would require large reinforcements of artillery. I was met there by Captain Randolph, the corps chief of artillery, who informed me that he had been ordered to place his batteries on the new line. Seeing Generals Meade and Sickles, not far off, in conversation, and supposing that General Meade had consented to the occupation, I sent at once to the reserve for more artillery, and authorized other general officers to draw on the same source. Here perhaps I may be allowed to say en passant that this large reserve, organized by the wise forethought of General McClellan, sometimes threatened with destruction, and once actually broken up, was often, as at Malvern Hill, and now at Gettysburg, an invaluable resource in the time of greatest need. When in 1864 in the Rapidan campaign it was ``got rid of,'' it reconstituted itself, without orders, and in a few weeks, through the necessities of the army, showing that ``principles vindicate themselves.''
When I arrived Birney's division was already posted on the crest from Devil's Den to the Peach Orchard, and along the Emmettsburg road, Ward's brigade on the left, Graham's at the angle, De Trobriand's connecting them by a thin line. Humphreys's division was on Graham's right, near the Emmettsburg road, Carr's brigade in the front line, about the Smith house, Brewster's in second line. Burling's, with the exception of Sewell's Fifth New Jersey Regiment, then in skirmish order at the front, was sent to reenforce Birney. Seeley's battery, at first posted on the right, was on after sent to the left of the Smith house, and replaced on the right by Turnbull's from the Artillery Reserve. Randolph had ordered Smith's battery, Fourth New York, to the rocky hill at the Devil's Den; Winslow's to the Wheat-field. He had placed Clark on the crest looking south, and his own (``E,'' First Rhode Island) near the angle, facing west. The whole corps was, however, too weak for the ground to be covered, and it was too late for Meade to withdraw it. Sykes's Fifth Corps had already been ordered up and was momentarily expected. As soon as fire opened, which was just as he arrived on the ground, General Meade sent also for Caldwell's division from Cemetery Ridge, and a division of the Twelfth Corps from Culp's, and soon after for troops from the Sixth Corps. McGilvery's artillery brigade soon arrived, from the reserve, and Bigelow's, Phillips's, Hart's, Ames's, and Thompson's batteries had been ordered into position on the crests, when the enemy opened from a long line of guns, stretching down to the crossing of the Emmettsburg pike. Smith's position at Devil's Den gave him a favorable oblique fire on a part of this line, and as he did not reply, I proceeded to the Den. Finding the acclivity steep and rocky, I dismounted and tied my horse to a tree before crossing the valley. My rank, brigadier-general, the command being that of a lieutenant- general, gave me a very small and insufficient staff, and even this had been recently cut down. The inspector of artillery Lieutenant- Colonel Warner, adjutant-general Captain Craig, my only aide Lieutenant Bissel, my one orderly, and even the flag-bearer necessary to indicate my presence to those seeking me, were busy conveying orders or messages, and I was alone; a not infrequent and an awkward thing for a general who had to keep up communications with every part of a battle-field and with the general-in-chief. On climbing to the summit, I found that Smith had just got his guns, one by one, over the rocks and chasms, into an excellent position. After pointing out to me the advancing lines of the enemy, he opened, and very effectively. Many guns were immediately turned on him, relieving so far the rest of the line. Telling him he would probably lose his battery, I left to seek for infantry supports, very doubtful if I would find my horse, for the storm of shell bursting over the place was enough to drive any animal wild. On reaching the foot of the cliff, I found myself in a plight at once ludicrous, painful, and dangerous. A herd of horned cattle had been driven into the valley between Devil's Den and Round Top, from which they could not escape. A shell had exploded in the body of one of them, tearing it to pieces; others were torn and wounded. All were stampeded, bellowing and rushing in their terror first to one side, then to the other, to escape the shells that were bursting over and amongst them. Cross I must, and in doing so I had my most trying experience of the battle of Gettysburg. Luckily the poor beasts were as much frightened as I was, but their rage was subdued by terror, and they were good enough to let me pass through scot-free, but ``badly demoralized.'' However, my horse was safe, I mounted, and in the busy excitement that followed almost forgot my scare.
It was not until about four P.M. that Longstreet got his two divisions into position in two lines, McLaws's on the right of Anderson's division of Hill's corps, and opposite the Peach Orchard; Hood's on the extreme Confederate right and crossing the Emmettsburg road. Hood had been ordered, keeping his left on that road, to break in the end of our line, supposed to be at the orchard; but perceiving that our left was ``refused'' (bent back towards Devil's Den), and noticing the importance of Round Top, he suggested to Longstreet that the latter be turned and attacked. The reply was that General Lee's orders were to attack along the Emmettsburg road. Again Hood sent his message and received the same reply, notwithstanding which he directed Law's brigade upon Round Top, in which movement a portion of Robertson's brigade joined, and the rest of the division was thrown upon Devil's Den and the ridge between it and the Peach Orchard. The first assaults were repulsed, but, after hard fighting, McLaws's division being also advanced, the angle was, towards six o'clock, broken in, after a resolute defense and with great loss on both sides. In the mean time three of Anderson's brigades were advancing on Humphreys, and the latter received orders from Birney, now in command of the corps, Sickles being severely wounded soon after six o'clock near the Trostle house, to throw back his left, form an oblique line in his rear, and connect with the right of Birney's division, then retiring. The junction was not effected, and Humphreys, greatly outnumbered, slowly and skillfully fell back to Cemetery Ridge, Gibbon sending two regiments and Brown's Rhode Island battery to his support. But the enemy was strong and covered the whole Second Corps front, now greatly weakened by detachments. Wilcox's, Perry's, and Wright's brigades pressed up to the ridge, outflanking Humphreys's right and left, and Wright broke through our line and seized the guns in his front, but was soon driven out, and not being supported all fell back, about dusk, under a heavy artillery fire.
As soon as Longstreet's attack commenced, General Warren was sent by General Meade to see to Little Round Top. He found it unoccupied by troops, and seeing the advance of Hood's lines, and also the near approach of Sykes's Fifth Corps from Rock Creek, immediately caused Weed's and Vincent's brigades and Hazlett's battery to be detached from the latter and hurried them to the summit. The passage of the six guns through the roadless woods and amongst the rocks was marvelous. Under ordinary circumstances it would have been considered an impossible feat, but the eagerness of the men to get into action with their comrades of the infantry, and the skillful driving, brought them without delay to the very summit, where they went immediately into battle. They were barely in time, for the enemy were also climbing the hill. A close and bloody hand-to-hand struggle ensued, which left both Round Tops in our possession. Weed and Hazlett were killed, and Vincent mortally wounded -- all young men of great promise. Weed had served with much distinction as an artillerist in the Peninsular, Second Bull Run, and Antietam campaigns, had become chief of artillery of his army corps, and at Chancellorsville showed such special aptitude and fitness for large artillery commands that he was immediately promoted from captain to brigadier-general and transferred to the infantry. Hazlett was killed whilst bending over his former chief, to receive his last message, and Lieutenant Rittenhouse efficiently commanded the battery during the remainder of the battle.
The enemy, however, clung to the woods and rocks at the base of Round Top, carried Devil's Den and its woods, and captured three of Smith's guns, who, however, effectively deprived the enemy of their use by carrying off all the implements.
The breaking in of the Peach Orchard angle exposed the flanks of the batteries on its crests, which retired firing, in order to cover the retreat of the infantry. Many guns of different batteries had to be abandoned because of the destruction of their horses and men; many were hauled off by hand; all the batteries lost heavily. Bigelow's Ninth Massachusetts made a stand close by the Trostle house in the corner of the field through which he had retired fighting with prolonges fixed. Although already much cut up, he was directed by McGilvery to hold that point at all hazards until a line of artillery could be formed in front of the wood beyond Plum Run; that is, on what we have called the ``Plum run line.'' This line was formed by collecting the serviceable batteries, and fragments of batteries, that were brought off, with which, and Dow's Maine battery fresh from the reserve, the pursuit was checked. Finally some twenty-five guns formed a solid mass, which unsupported by infantry held this part of the line, aided by Humphreys's movements, and covered by its fire the abandoned guns on the field until they could be brought off, as all were, except perhaps one. When, after fully accomplishing its purpose, all that was left of Bigelow's battery was withdrawn, it was closely pressed by Humphries's Twenty-first Mississippi, the only Confederate regiment which succeeded in crossing the run. His men had entered the battery and fought hand-to-hand with the cannoneers; one was killed whilst trying to spike a gun, and another knocked down with a handspike while endeavoring to drag off a prisoner. Of the four battery-officers one was killed, another mortally, and a third, Captain Bigelow, severely wounded. Of seven sergeants, two were killed and four wounded; or a total of twenty-eight men, including two missing; and eighty out of eighty-eight horses were killed and wounded. As the battery had sacrificed itself for the safety of the line, its work is specially noticed as typical of the service that artillery is not infrequently called upon to render, and did render in other instances at Gettysburg besides this one.
When Sickles was wounded General Meade directed Hancock to take command of the Third as well as his own corps, which he again turned over to Gibbon. About 7:15 P.M., the field was in a critical condition. Birney's division was now broken up; Humphreys's was slowly falling back, under cover of McGilvery's guns; Anderson's line was advancing. On its right, Barksdale's brigade, except the Twenty-first Mississippi, was held in check only by McGilvery's artillery, to whose support Hancock now brought up Willard's brigade, of the Second Corps. Placing the Thirty- ninth New York in reserve, Willard with his other three regiments charged Barksdale's brigade and drove it back nearly to the Emmettsburg road, when he was himself repulsed by a heavy artillery and infantry fire, and fell back to his former position near the sources of Plum Run. In this affair Willard was killed and Barksdale mortally wounded. Meanwhile the Twenty-first Mississippi crossed the run from the neighborhood of the Trostle house, and drove out the men of Watson's battery (``I,'' Fifth United States), on the extreme left of McGilvery's line, but was in turn driven off by the thirty-ninth New York led by Lieutenant Peeples of the battery, musket in hand, who thus recovered his guns, Watson being severely wounded.
Birney's division once broken, it was difficult to stem the tide of defeat. Hood's and McLaws's divisions -- excepting Barksdale's brigade -- compassed the Devil's Den and its woods, and as the Federal reinforcements from other corps came piecemeal, they were beaten in detail until by successive accretions they greatly outnumbered their opponents, who had all the advantages of position, when the latter in turn retired, but were not pursued. This fighting was confined almost wholly to the woods and Wheat-field between the Peach Orchard and Little Round Top, and the great number of brigade and regimental commanders, as well as of inferior officers and soldiers, killed and wounded on both sides, bears testimony to its close and desperate character. General Meade was on the ground active in bringing up and putting in reinforcements, and in doing so had his horse shot under him. At the close of the day the Confederates held the base of the Round Tops, Devil's Den, its woods, and the Emmettsburg road, with skirmishers thrown out as far as the Trostle house; the Federals had the two Round Tops, the Plum Run line, and Cemetery Ridge. During the night the Plum run line, except the wood on its left front (occupied by McCandless's brigade, Crawford's division, his other brigade being on Big Round top), was abandoned; the Third Corps was massed on the left and rear of Caldwell's division, which had reoccupied its short ridge, with McGilvery's artillery on its crest. The Fifth Corps remained on and about Round Top, and Ruger's division of the Twelfth returned to Culp's Hill.
When Longstreet's guns were heard, Ewell opened a cannonade, which after an hour's firing was overpowered by the Federal artillery on Cemetery Hill. Johnson's division then advanced, and found only one brigade -- Greene's -- of the Twelfth Corps in position, the others having been sent to the aid of Sickles at the Peach Orchard. Greene fought with skill and determination for two or three hours, and, reenforced by seven or eight hundred men of the First and Eleventh Corps, succeeded in holding its own entrenchments, the enemy taking possession of the abandoned works of Geary and Ruger. This brought Johnson's troops near the Baltimore pike, but the darkness prevented their seeing or profiting by the advantage when within their reach. When Ruger's division returned from Round Top, and Geary's from Rock Creek, the found Johnson in possession of their entrenchments, and immediately prepared to drive him out at daylight.
It had been ordered that when Johnson engaged Culp's Hill, Early and Rodes should assault Cemetery Hill. Early's attack was made with great spirit, by Hoke's and Avery's brigades, Gordon's being in reserve; the hill was ascended through the wide ravine between Cemetery and Culp's hills, a line of infantry on the slopes was broken, and Wiederich's Eleventh Corps, and Ricketts's reserve batteries near the brow of the hill overrun; but the excellent position of Stevens's twelve-pounders at the head of the ravine, which enabled him to sweep it, the arrival of Carroll's brigade sent unasked by Hancock, -- a happy inspiration, as this line had been weakened to send supports both to Greene and Sickles, -- and the failure of Rodes to cooperate with Early, caused the attack to miscarry. The cannoneers of the two batteries so summarily ousted rallied, and recovered their guns by a vigorous attack with pistols by those who had them, by others with handspikes, rammers, stones, and even fence-rails; the ``Dutchmen'' showing they were in no way inferior to their ``Yankee'' comrades, who had been ``running'' them ever since Chancellorsville. After an hour's desperate fighting the two Confederate brigades were driven out with heavy loss, Avery being among the killed.
At the close of this second day a consultation of corps commanders was held at General Meade's headquarters. I was not present, although summoned, but was informed that the vote was unanimous to hold our lines, and to await an attack for at least one day before taking the offensive, and General Meade so decided.
Henry J. Hunt
“The thief comes only to steal and kill and destroy; I have come that they may have life, and have it to the full.”
– Jesus, John 10:10